The dog has a special relationship with humans, going beyond that of other domestic animals. Recent evidence suggests this comes from domestication rather than wolf behaviour, perhaps involving something as simple as a change in natural looking behaviour.
A dozen times a day, we follow someone's eye gaze to find out what interests them and what they are thinking about: the tactic comes naturally to us. Small surprise, then, that when our closest relatives, the chimpanzees, were discovered also to follow eye-gaze it seemed obvious that they too were interested in others' attention and thoughts. But much diligent laboratory work has failed to provide support for this idea, although many experiments have confirmed that chimpanzees are indeed good at following human gaze. They are not fooled by occluding barriers and only look for a target of gaze in places where sight can penetrate; nor are they distracted by conspicuous targets closer to them but slightly off-line. Chimpanzees do not, however, seem to make the same deductions as we do from gaze following. One example of this is that, when experimenters have used their gaze to point to where food is present, chimpanzees do not get it; if the experimenters use their finger, hand or even their whole arm to point, chimpanzees still seem to find it difficult to follow the hint. Yet domestic dogs learn this task easily, even those not from breeds specifically bred as 'pointers'. Dogs are able to follow pointing by head and eyes, or by hand, even if the hand is opposite to the side on which the target lies -'crossed pointing' -and even if the hand remains stationary or the human moves in a direction opposite to their pointing. These impressive abilities raise two questions. Firstly, is this a special-purpose skill or part of a complex of abilities with wider implications? In humans, pointing and gaze-following have been causally linked to reference, one of the fundamentals of language [1] ; moreover, pointing and gaze following are generally seen as part of a suite of abilities that together confer 'theory of mind' [2] . Nothing in the normal behaviour of dogs gives convincing evidence of any canine ability to understand mental states, let alone reference. Perhaps further work will overturn this bleak view, but for the moment a special-purpose adaptation seems most likely. But for what purpose: how and when did these skills enter the canine repertoire? Many people would have said we need look no further than the dog's wild ancestor, the wolf, whose pack hunting must surely benefit from finely-tuned abilities to indicate location or movement of prey with eyes and nose. Now, two groups of researchers [3, 4] have found convincing evidence that the origin of dogs' ability to point and to follow pointing lie elsewhere, in the history of their domestication by humans.
The evidence comes from wolves that were brought up as puppies with human carers and can therefore be tested in direct comparison to dogs. Hare et al. [3] used a variety of different cues to indicate which of two locations held food: gaze alone, gaze and pointing, or gaze and pointing combined with audible tapping on the place itself. Yet the wolves failed resoundingly to follow the cues, in contrast to domestic dogs which managed with any of them. It seems particularly surprising that these wolves were unable, despite over 30 trials on which getting a food reward depended on a correct choice, to work out that tapping on a box correlated with finding food inside it; surely this is a simple task for any species able to learn in social situations?
Miklósi et al. [4] , reporting in this issue of Current Biology, have an explanation for this puzzle: by their standards, the wolves studied by Hare et al. [3] were not properly socialized at all. True, the puppies were reared in a human family from 10 days old, but they could still interact with littermates and in any case this regime only persisted for 5 weeks. Miklósi et al. [4] worked much harder to socialize their subjects. Each wolf was reared by a single human carer from 4 days old for 3 months, and this involved 24 hour contact: the wolves were carried in baby-slings and even slept with the carers. As a result, each wolf's attachment to their primary carer is likely to be very much stronger, and it is the carer who tests it. Unlike Hare et al.'s subjects, none of these wolves had any difficulty understanding indication by touching, and they readily followed pointing if the finger was placed near the target. They also learned to follow distal pointing, although they only developed this ability over many trials.
Nevertheless, even the most highly socialized wolves perform at much lower levels than domestic dogs on pointing tasks: and crucially, they have shown no sign of understanding gaze, in the sense of using it to find the target indicated. It does not seem that the popular explanation, that dogs inherited their superior abilities at using social cues from wolf ancestors, will hold water; but if not, then what exactly has domestication done to the dog? Hare et al. [3] suggest only that "some aspects of the socio-cognitive abilities of dogs have converged … with those of humans" as a result of "a phylogenetic process of enculturation, perhaps similar in some ways to the ontogenetic process of enculturation experienced by some nonhuman primate individuals raised by humans". [5] to account for the fact that human-raised great apes succeed at many cognitive tasks where zoo-raised or lab-raised individuals fail. In brief, the idea is that the human mind is to a considerable degree a cultural product, and that humanrearing is adapted to bring about this cultural transformation [6] . Even when the subject is a nonhuman ape, they suppose, some aspects of the cultural achievement of human cognition can be transmitted to it by human rearing. On this view, enculturated apes have abilities that really 'belong' to our species, not theirs. By no means all researchers accept this, however. The alternative, eloquently defended by Frans de Waal [7] , is that human rearing simply changes the ape's orientation towards treating people as significant others, and indeed viewing themselves as people, so that they perform humanposed and human-relevant tasks readily and reveal their species' natural abilities to the full. In any case, 'phylogenetic enculturation' is at the moment little more than an intriguing label.
At the opposite extreme, Miklósi et al.
[4] offer a simple and straightforward answer, and back it with an experiment. To them, the key thing is that wolves do not look at faces: consequently, these animals have little chance of learning the revealing contingencies between gaze direction and events in the world. If so, this neatly accounts for highly socialized wolves' ability to learn the significance of touching, proximal and (eventually) distal pointing, while still failing to follow human gaze.
To test this theory, Miklósi et al.
[4] posed foodretrieval tasks to both dogs and wolves, but then made the tasks insoluble; for instance, where the solution was to pull a cord attached to a food item, they nailed down the string so that it could not be pulled. Domestic dogs' response was clear and immediate: they turned to look at their owner's face, and alternated gaze between owner and task. Social referencing is an important part of human communication, and these appeals were readily understood. This does not mean that their appeals were made for the same reasons as a young child might, because it understood the superior knowledge of the adult. Quite the reverse: Miklósi et al.'s [4] explanation works for an animal that has no understanding of mental states, but can learn quickly and -crucially -looks at the human face.
Highly socialized wolves, in contrast, just kept trying to solve the task and did not look round. Lacking an innate tendency to look at human faces, wolves have no chance of learning the key importance of gaze, although they can readily pick up other human methods of pointing. It seems Miklósi et al.'s group have found a rather simple explanation for the difference in cognitive capacity: what domestication has done for the dog is to select for the tendency to look at the human face in situations of uncertainty. Our long and productive association with the dog may have followed from this single behavioural change, they suggest, because it opens the door to mutual learning of how to read the behavioural intentions and likely needs of the other species.
